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NO. 10 FEBRUARY 2019  Introduction 
Tajikistan on the Road to Totalitarianism 
Andrea Schmitz 
Rather overshadowed by ongoing violence in Afghanistan and an unexpected political 
opening in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan is witnessing the emergence of a totalitarian system 
focused entirely on the president. Alongside legal moves and key appointments, ideo-
logical propaganda plays a central role. Two main trends are involved: the presenta-
tion of President Emomali Rahmon as bringer of peace and guarantor of national unity, 
and the establishment of a canon of “national” norms and values designed to enforce 
social and ideological homogeneity. The spectre of Islamic fundamentalism is instru-
mentalised to consolidate the ruling ideology, while surveillance and sanctioning 
enforce behavioural conformity. 
 
Unlike the neighbouring Central Asian 
republics, Tajikistan’s consolidation as an 
independent state after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union was interrupted by a civil 
war (1992–1997). That event remains an 
important point of reference for the post-
communist elite under President Emomali 
Rahmon, who came to power on the back 
of the war. The externally mediated 1997 
peace agreement with the United Tajik 
Opposition (UTO) forced Rahmon to share 
power with his former adversaries. The 
Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) played an 
especially prominent role, having reorgan-
ised itself after being the strongest group 
within the opposition alliance during the 
war. The IRP advocated a secular and 
democratic political order on the basis of 
Muslim values. In a country plagued by 
poverty, whose economic survival depends 
on labour migration and foreign loans, it 
found its base among the religiously con-
servative and the economically marginal-
ised. After entering parliament in 2000 the 
IRP grew to become the strongest opposi-
tion force, claiming about forty thousand 
active members in 2014. 
Elimination of Opposition 
President Rahmon, whose supporters are 
organised in the People’s Democratic Party 
(PDP, the de facto successor to the Soviet-era 
Communist Party), has increasingly ignored 
the peace agreement since the end of the 
civil war. Former warlords have been suc-
cessively excluded from politics, along with 
political entrepreneurs and businessmen 
who dared to challenge the President’s 
power. 
The IRP was not exempt from this policy. 
Its open complaints of corruption and 
abuse of power by representatives of the 
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elite and its demands for good governance 
in harmony with the tenets of Islam pre-
sented a particularly serious challenge to 
the regime. But as long as it was represented 
in parliament (even if only holding a few 
seats) and its status as a legal political orga-
nisation was protected by the constitution, 
there was no legal possibility to exclude it 
from the political arena. In fact, the regime 
exploited the IRP’s existence internally and 
externally to portray Tajikistan as a country 
orientated on democratic principles. At the 
same time, the regime concentrated on 
undermining the party’s support through 
defamation and repression. In the March 
2015 parliamentary elections, which were 
subject to numerous irregularities, the IRP 
failed to win any seats; only parties loyal 
to the regime have been represented ever 
since. A few months after the election the 
IRP’s registration was annulled, its struc-
tures destroyed and leading members im-
prisoned. 
In September 2015 the regime declared 
the IRP a terrorist organisation, followed 
by a merciless hunt for party members and 
their families. The persecution continues to 
this day and also targets activists who fled 
abroad. 
Consolidating Autocracy 
Elimination of the political opposition 
through concerted action by the organs 
of the state was accompanied by legal 
measures and appointments that institu-
tionally cement the personal power of 
the President and his family. In December 
2015, soon after the crushing of the IRP, 
parliament passed a law granting President 
Rahmon life-long immunity from prosecu-
tion. The same law stipulates that the Presi-
dent be referred to as “leader of the nation” 
(peshvoi millat) in official contexts including 
state television, together with the attri-
bute “founder of peace and national unity”. 
Soon thereafter, in May 2016, Rahmon 
secured his open-ended grip on power 
through a referendum that abolished the 
restriction to two presidential terms. At 
the same time the minimum age for the 
presidency was reduced from 35 to 30 
years. That would enable Rahmon’s son 
Rustam Emomali (30) to stand in the 2020 
presidential election. 
Rustam Emomali has been mayor of the 
capital Dushanbe since January 2017, hav-
ing previously served in two strategically 
important positions, as head of the customs 
service and (from 2015) head of the state 
anti-corruption agency. Other members 
of the presidential family also hold high 
offices of state. Ozoda Rahmon, the Presi-
dent’s eldest daughter, is senator in the 
upper chamber of parliament and since 
January 2016 the President’s chief of staff. 
Her husband, Jamoliddin Nuraliev, is First 
Deputy Chairman of the National Bank of 
Tajikistan and represents his country on the 
board of governors of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. Other 
family members control lucrative businesses. 
This concentration of political and eco-
nomic power in the head of state’s family is 
not specific to Tajikistan. The neighbouring 
republics also demonstrate more or less 
strong tendencies for dynastic rule and con-
solidation of power through institutional 
mechanisms. Kazakhstan’s President Nur-
sultan Nazarbayev, for example, can stand 
for office as often as he wishes thanks to a 
constitutional amendment adopted in 2007. 
He too was granted the title of “leader of 
the nation” (elbasy) in conjunction with a 
2010 law granting him life-long immunity 
from prosecution. 
Cult of Personality 
Public shows of veneration of the head of 
state are an established feature of represen-
tation of power in post-Soviet Central Asia. 
But with his elevation to “leader of the 
nation” the cult of personality around the 
Tajik President attained dimensions that 
otherwise appeared exclusive to Turk-
menistan. In the 1990s Turkmen President 
Saparmurat Niyazov established a totali-
tarian system encompassing all areas of 
society, which still exists today. Since the 
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de facto abandonment of the 1997 peace 
agreement and the associated abolition of 
political pluralism, Tajikistan now appears 
to be moving in a similar direction. 
President Rahmon is omnipresent in the 
state media, while the veneration of the 
“leader of the nation” in word and image is 
everyday routine in the country’s places of 
education. This cultivates a narrative that 
the state leadership has exploited since the 
civil war to marginalise other more differ-
entiated interpretations. In this version 
of events President Rahmon is the bringer 
of peace who saved the fatherland from 
the civil war and restored national unity by 
virtue of his outstanding abilities. Instru-
mentalisation of the IRP as a major threat is 
central to the dramaturgy of the narrative. 
The party is portrayed as a dangerous adver-
sary seeking – even from exile and in alli-
ance with Islamist terrorists – to divide the 
country, undermine peace and stability, and 
provoke a new civil war. The threat is con-
jured incessantly, even though the IRP has 
become irrelevant to Tajik politics since 2015. 
Attempts to cast doubt over or relativise 
the official narrative are treated as an at-
tack on the integrity of the state, as demon-
strated by the repression of independent 
media. The weekly Nigoh (View), which sup-
plied regular analysis on social and political 
issues, was forced to cease publication in 
November 2016. Other media, websites and 
social networks disseminating critical re-
ports frequently find their work obstructed 
or blocked entirely. 
Propaganda 
The glorification of the President is not, 
however, generated exclusively through 
repression of those who fail to demonstrate 
sufficient enthusiasm. Active propaganda 
by high-ranking officials, academics, artists 
and performers is at least as important for 
generating loyalty. The inauguration of a 
new public holiday dedicated to the Presi-
dent in November 2016, for example, was 
the occasion for an essay-writing competi-
tion at all places of higher education on the 
subject of “The Youth Follows the Leader 
of the Nation”. State television broadcast a 
documentary about President Rahmon en-
titled “A Man of Destiny”, while a theatre 
play (“The Chosen One”) was dedicated to 
him and the interior minister published 
an ode in the weekly Tojikiston. The poem, 
written in the classical rubā’ī form asserts 
that the President had been “sent by God” 
(pajgomi jazdonī) to the Tajiks. The chairman 
of the State Committee for National Secu-
rity also took up the theme in the news-
paper Jumhuriyat, which is read principally 
by public officials. 
To dismiss such gestures as folklore 
would be to underestimate the strength of 
their political message. Such speech acts 
by high-ranking officials formulate implicit 
behavioural maxims, addressed both to gov-
ernment employees and the broader public. 
Indeed, one year after the publication of 
the interior minister’s sycophantic verses, 
the newspaper Tojikiston announced a prize 
for the best poem about the country and its 
leader. The minister’s work itself also lived 
on, being set to music in 2017 by a well-
known Tajik pop quartet and disseminated 
on the internet as a video clip. Other Tajik 
pop stars also reach broad audiences with 
repetitively similar images praising the 
achievements of the “leader of the nation”. 
Identity Politics 
Containing Islam plays a central role in the 
efforts of the state elites to create a socially 
and ideologically homogeneous Tajik soci-
ety. The success of the moderate IRP and 
the propaganda of various extremist groups 
demonstrate the significant mobilising 
potential of Islam. Containing it is thus a 
priority for the state. 
Two components are crucial. Firstly, strict 
oversight of mosques and their personnel 
is intended to create a politically quiescent 
state Islam and banish all visible signs of re-
ligious practice from public space. Secondly, 
a canon of “national” values and associated 
behavioural rules intervenes deeply into 
the everyday lives of the population. 
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Above all the hijab and the beard are 
stigmatised as “un-Tajik”. An “anti-radicali-
sation” campaign saw men having their 
beards shaved off under police supervision 
while women were publicly admonished 
not to wear the hijab. In April 2018 the 
Ministry of Culture issued a 367-page set of 
guidelines for Tajik women’s dress, which is 
not legally binding but does generate con-
siderable pressure of conformity. Linguistic 
measures are also employed to ward off 
outside influence. Russian place names 
have been changed and Slavic endings on 
family names are regarded as undesirable. 
Popular Arabic names are taboo, with a 
recommendation to give children Tajik 
names instead. 
The Law Governing the Practice of Tradi-
tions, Rites and Celebrations was amended 
in 2017 and 2018 to prohibit Islamic sym-
bols at circumcisions, weddings and funer-
als, restrict attendance to close relatives and 
bar excessive spending. Birthday celebra-
tions are limited to family members. Promi-
nent figures are not exempted from these 
rules. Violations are strictly pursued and in 
the case of civil servants can lead to dis-
missal. 
Through such massive interventions in 
the private lives of citizens, the abolition of 
political pluralism and ideological mobili-
sation the Tajik state, backed by numerous 
external actors with economic and security 
interests, is following an increasingly totali-
tarian trajectory. Europe, which is commit-
ted to cultivating democratic principles and 
rule of law in Tajikistan, should be aware 
that this is going to become even more diffi-
cult in future. 
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